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The European Constitution is not a single text. Rather, it emerged, changed over time, and devel-
oped an incomplete and constantly transforming ensemble of texts, rules, institutions, competences 
and implementation procedures. The notion of dispositif grasps the form, outlook and logic of Eu-
ropean economic governance and agenda-setting practices to analyse the logic of economic constitu-
tionalism based on complex translation processes. With the ‘discursive pentagon’ model, the paper 
will show how an economic idea, grounded within the European constitution, was implemented by 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal through different forms of translation in the aftermath of 2009 finan-
cial crisis. The paper argues that austerity was part of the EU constitutional system moved through 
a mechanism of interpretation consisting of different stages, tools and discourses before it was finally 
(un)realised in different member states. The interpretative flexibility of the EU economics appa-
ratus is finally illustrated by a discourse analysis of the European semester. 
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European intellectuals from different disciplines and political ideologies in-
tensively discussed the need for, possibility and scope of a European Constitution 
for a long time. This debate has intensified in recent years due to manifold crisis ex-
periences through the financial crisis 2007, the subsequent Euro crisis and the on-
going COVID-19 crisis. However, on which political, institutional, epistemic and 
discursive basics could such a Constitution be formed today? What are the condi-
tions in contemporary Europe that could act as starting point for devising a Euro-
pean Constitution?  
To date, the European Union has no formal Constitution comparable to 
the American United States Constitution, the German Grundgesetz or the Italian Cos-
tituzione della Repubblica Italiana. Yet, in recent decades, a set of de facto rules has 
emerged which work like a Constitution and locate the European Union somewhere 
between an intergovernmental system and an incomplete transnational state. This 
sort of European ‘constitution’ is characterised by four aspects. First, it does not ex-
ist as a single text read and understandable by everybody. It is rather a set of con-
tracts, rules and procedures, and institutions. Second, it was not compiled and de-
clared by a constitutional assembly but by sovereign nation-states. Third, this set of 
documents, rules and procedures, and institutions, that we will call a European con-
stitution, changed over time and developed, until today, into a still incomplete and 
constantly transforming ensemble of texts, rules, institutions, competences, imple-
menting provisions and so forth. In contrast to Constitution in the sense of a ‘social 
contract’, the European constitution is what Foucault once called a ‘dispositif’ 
(Foucault 1980). Finally, the European constitution is strongly influenced by eco-
nomic thinking, concepts, wording and discourses. Next to law (and English), eco-
nomics has developed as an ‘official’ language within and for Europe. For this rea-
son, we use the notion of ‘European economic constitution’ since economic expert 
discourses have significant influence on the formation of Europeanisation process-
es.    




Since the European Constitution does not exist as a single text supported 
by a clear-cut institutional structure, we use the notion of ‘dispositif’ in order to 
grasp the diversity of texts, the complexity of institutional fields and the heterogene-
ity of discourses to grasp European constitutional practices. Our paper will elabo-
rate one important aspect of the European constitution, namely, how and why the 
installation of constitutional principles is based on complex processes of ‘discursive 
translation’. In contrast to institutionalist perspectives on Europeanisation (Fligstein 
& Stone Sweet 2002) that focus on the interaction between market dynamics and 
governmental regulations in order to study the evolution of fixed rules making inte-
gration processes possible, we will show that the European constitution can only 
work because of the interpretative openness and non-fixed and pragmatic character 
of the constitutional dispositif. Since the dispositif is an open and dynamic ensem-
ble, translational discourse practices are needed in order to fix interpretations and 
resolve conflicts. The European constitution is and always was a discursive battle-
ground open for diverse interpretations, conflicting implementations and political 
negotiations. In addition, we are also critical of legalist perspectives (Bruff 2014), 
diagnosing an “increasingly nondemocratic (state) through its subordination to con-
stitutional and legal rules” (p. 116). However, what Bruff calls ‘authoritarian neolib-
eralism’ was indeed part of European crisis management based on the European 
economic constitution; yet, as we will show, authoritarian neoliberalism was pre-
dominant only within a relatively short period (namely between 2009 and 2015) and 
it was applied in full power basically to one country: Greece. What we want to show 
is that authoritarian neoliberalism is only one specific (and not very successfully) 
modality for translating austerity. 
Taking the example of austerity politics during the financial crisis after 
2009, we will show how an economic idea (neoclassic, ordoliberal thinking) that is 
grounded within the European constitution (especially through the so-called Maas-
tricht Criteria) was implemented by different member states through different forms 
of translation. Our thesis is that austerity (as well as other economic measures) was 
not implemented as a doctrine through authoritarian instruction. On the contrary, 
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austerity policies as part of the EU constitutional system moved through a mecha-
nism of interpretation consisting of different stages, tools and discourses before it 
was finally (un)realised in different member states. As for the current period, we aim 
to show how and why constitutional rules are open to different interpretations and 
produce unexpected outcomes. Looking at the EU economic constitution as an 
open discursive field can offer scholars, politicians, activists and ordinary people 
new ways to understand (and act in) the formation and transformation of the EU 
economic constitution. 
Our argumentation is presented in six sections. Section 2 reveals the eco-
nomic roots of the European economic constitution through a short historical re-
construction of the emergence of the European Union. Section 3 presents our ana-
lytical approach and Section 4 provides insights into the incomplete and crisis-prone 
character of the Maastricht rules, pointing to the constant and ongoing reforms, 
limitations and expansion of the rules between 1992 and 2020. This section pro-
vides the empirical backdrop for our idea to analyse the European economic consti-
tution as a translation system. Against this background, Section 5 presents the ‘dis-
cursive pentagon’. This model shows how translational processes operate. It gives 
an idea of how various institutions, actors and texts come together in economically 
informed discourses where specialists, technicians, experts and politicians negotiate 
an apparatus for the perception, valuation and evaluation of, and intervention in, 
Europeanised social realities. The final Sections present two illustrative analyses 
showing how translation works on the level of institutional fields (Section 6) and on 
the level of institutional discourses (Section 7). Section 6 shows how austerity was 
translated in Greece, Portugal and Italy, pointing to the translational dynamics via 
member state implementation, and Section 7 takes the interpretative dynamics of 
EU documents into account, by showing how economic argumentation works. 
Both parts illustrate our thesis that the European economic constitution is not a 
monolithic bloc but a discursive system open to conflict, interpretation and social 
change.              
 




2. The historical emergence of the EU economic constitution as an institu-
tional apparatus  
The institutional apparatus of the European Union, as we experience it to-
day, was born out of a decades-long process where different professional epistemic 
actors from the realms of law, politics and economics were formed. In order to un-
derstand how the EU economic constitution is consolidated as discursive system 
where economics plays a privileged role, we need to briefly retrace how economics 
has come to hegemonize the discursive field of the contemporary EU system. In 
this section, we show how economics has hegemonized EU constitutional function-
ing since its inception. This historical account explains the analytical trajectories we 
develop to understand the institutional-discursive logics of the EU economic appa-
ratus. 
Nation-states are usually formed on the basis of culture, language and citi-
zenship. In contrast, Europeanisation is deeply embedded within economic think-
ing, practices and structural transformation. As an economic governance system, 
the European Union can be analysed “as an evolving system of governance that 
makes and enforces market rules” (Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2002, p. 1214). The his-
tory of Europe and the evolution of the European economic constitution cannot be 
understood without these economic foundations. Accordingly, technical-juridical 
expertise is linked to a constitutional utopia that stems from transnational dialogues 
framing problems and addressing solutions in the reconstruction of continental 
economies in the post-war era. Those technical economic discourses were already at 
work in the three founding European communities: the coal and steel union (1952), 
the European economic community (1957) and the atom and energy union (1957). 
Initiated and pushed forward by these founding institutions, economic expertise 
emerged strongly and affirmed itself as governance language.   
The idea for a single economic government of the European continent 
dates back to the interwar period, as an elite-oriented project devised by US, Ger-
man and French business leaders (Van der Pijl 1984). However, at the end of the 
Second World War, juridical expertise offered this idea the means to construct a po-
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litical union, moving from an elite strategy to a professional space of affirmation for 
political projects. As Cohen (2007) has shown, juridical expertise was used to con-
struct a transnational institutional order able to present political matters as technical 
issues. Cohen highlight how the preponderant role of legal expertise “illustrates the 
strategies of ideological neutralization that have turned many of the political issues 
raised by European integration into technical matters, in particular regarding the 
‘form’ and ‘structure’ of this loosely institutionalized trans-national order” (p. 113). 
The creative role of juridical expertise in the building of a legal order inspired by 
constitutional principles is elaborated through discourses of European jurispru-
dence. 
Since the Treaty of Rome (1957), the logic of the constitutionalisation of a 
social market economy has been the main route to reconstruct and form Europe as 
an institutional space. Through this, the fundamental principles of a social market 
economy were integrated into constitutional laws and rules (Dardot & Laval 2013). 
The emergence of European institutional spaces occurred within a broader political-
institutional movement towards political sovereignty legitimized over economic ef-
ficiency and elaborated by ordoliberal thinkers (Dardot & Laval 2013; Foucault 
2008). 
Throughout the ‘golden era of capitalism’ (the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s), the 
construction of constitutional scaffolding served as institutional technology to offer 
legal coverage of energy-sector mergers and trusts. Concurrently, the intercontinen-
tal General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the construction of Eu-
ropean Economic Community in 1957 forced national economies to construct their 
export-led models of post-war capitalism. The technocratic character of the com-
mon European market operated as a disciplining device reshaping the calculation of 
financial needs for the rhythm and expansion of national economic systems (see de 
Cecco 1997 for the Italian case). While economic policy infrastructure started to be 
experimented with by national cadres, the constitutional definition of economic 
governance remained frozen by the monetary policy of the Fed (USA). Only with 
the recurring monetary crises of the ’70s European was institution building re-




launched to face monetary instability. At the conference of Hamburg, financial ar-
chitecture was inaugurated for the increasing construction of a safe space to protect 
continental economies from global turbulence in monetary markets, determined by 
the unilateral turn of the US (Arrighi 1994). The crisis of liberal corporate compro-
mise transformed the European institutional space into a privileged site of affirma-
tion for economic discourses. In the aftermath of the oil crisis in the 1970s, eco-
nomic expert discourses arrived at the edge of governmental agendas thanks to their 
proposals for solving the economic crises at this time through a mixture of Keynes-
ianism interventionism (i.e., ‘Werner plan’ idea, national fiscal policies) and neolib-
eral measures (i.e., Washington consensus). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, economic discourses were central elements 
and transnational investors and industrial lobbies seized on the process of relaunch-
ing European integration. This continental socio-political re-composition was ar-
ticulated in discourses such as a ‘national-champion strategy’ and ‘neoliberal com-
petitiveness policies’ (van Apeldoorn 2002) led to the foundation of neoliberal 
‘competition states’ (Hirsch 1995) informed by neoclassical economics and pushed 
forward by the increasing need to safeguard profit rates within an increasingly glob-
alised world (Jessop 1993). Above all, what these discourses shared was a centrality 
of economics as shared language in the framing of the relaunch of the European 
formation process that started at end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Whereas the 
first decades of Europeanisation were characterised first by juridical experts and 
then by sector-oriented economic thinking (energy and steel), from the late ’80s 
onwards the entire macro economy was increasingly seen as a governmental field 
through the lens of neoclassical micro economics (Huffschmid 1994). 
 
3. Analytical approach: economics as discursive device 
This historical-epistemic evolutionary process has methodological conse-
quences for the role of ‘economics’ as a discourse analytical approach. As Mudge 
and Vauchez (2012) and Schmidt-Wellenburg (2017) have shown, economics was 
established as the main epistemic and discursive source in the ongoing process of 
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Europeanisation, especially after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Accordingly, we un-
derstand economics as a discursive device that contributes to form and transform 
the European economic constitution on the symbolic as well as institutional levels. 
We conceptualise economics analytically as a language, a system of metaphors and 
discursive devices that is part of a broader governmentality apparatus and a main 
instrument for forming a European constitution. As we have sketched out in the 
last section, the process of Europeanisation had economic language as the bulk of 
its functioning, which was an integrated element of the constitutional apparatus of 
Europe. Against this backdrop, we study the constitutional role of economics at the 
symbolic-discursive level (based on texts, speeches and other linguistic systems) as 
well as at the institutional (councils, administrations, policies) level in order to un-
derstand the logics and dynamics of Europeanisation.     
This economic expert discourse approach draws on recent analyses and 
discussions in economic sociology (Callon 1998), cultural political economy (Hall 
1989) and the economic history of ideas (Morgan 1990; Desrosières 1998). Espe-
cially, social studies of economics have highlighted how economics, as an epistemic-
professional apparatus, does not simply describe socio-political realities but rather 
contributes to shape them (MacKenzie et al. 2007; Boldyrev & Svetlova 2016; 
Maesse et al. 2021). These studies focus on the social status of economics as a de-
vice of power, legitimacy and discourse that is used in many non-academic contexts 
as a tool for changing the economy and influencing social relations (Fitzgerald & O’ 
Rourke 2016; Pühringer & Griesser 2020). Whereas orthodox Marxists have often 
understood economics as a ruling class ideology, and liberals conceptualise econom-
ics as ‘pure science’, social studies of economics analyse a broad variety of format-
ting practices in which economic expert knowledge is involved (Maesse 2015; Pahl 
& Sparsam 2015). In this vein, we understand economics neither as a hard science 
describing and observing economic reality, nor as a false consciousness; rather, we 
consider economics as a discursive and institutional tool for intervention to shape 
state/society constellations and power/knowledge relations (Schmidt-Wellenburg 
2017). In this sense, economic expert discourses provide a language for governance, 




interpretation and problem-solving. Economics as a device is a powerful tool for 
transforming social relations (Desrosières 1998).  
In the case of Europeanisation, economics is the main cultural resource, 
because economics as a transnational language is the product of the most globalised 
academic cultures (Dezalay & Garth 2009; Maesse 2018; Rossier & Bühlmann 
2018). Being detached from specific national contexts makes economics a powerful 
forming and integrating force of the European Union which often remains invisible 
to European laypeople, corresponding to an opaque system of signs that appear to 
outsiders like technocratic hieroglyphs (Maesse 2020a). 
However, in analysing economics as a discursive device we need to under-
stand it as a broader dispositif (Foucault 2008; Maesse 2020b) that allows us to ana-
lyse economic expert discourses as an empirical object. A dispositif consists of insti-
tutional constellations, texts and symbols, rules and procedures, conflicts over in-
terpretation and it is formed through a historical evolutionary struggle. Thus, dis-
positif analysis approaches its object of study as a complex entity. The analytical ap-
proach has been outlined in detail elsewhere (Maesse 2015; 2018; 2020a, b). In this 
paper, we exemplify and illustrate how the Europe Union as an economic dispositif 
can be analysed by taking into account different aspects of it. Accordingly, we ana-
lyse economic expert discourse by combining different analytical tools such as ge-
nealogical reconstructions of institutional constellations (Section 2 and 4), economic 
analyses of policies (Section 6) and discourse analysis of economic expert texts (Sec-
tion 7). Due to lack of space, the illustrative case studies in this paper are based on 
secondary literature on the historical genealogy, institutions, policy implementations 
and selective policy documents from the European Semester. Accordingly, econom-
ic expert discourses are analysed based on empirical data to guarantee an open re-
search process. Economic expert discourses in the politics of constitutionalisation 
cannot be investigated from general concepts or theories but must be open to his-
torical transformations reflected by empirical data. 
In addition, analysing the European constitution from the point of view of 
economics as a discursive device can help us to understand the conflictual and in-
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complete character of EU politics (Trenz et al. 2015). Europe is seen as a hetero-
genous field of knowledge production, changing institutional constellations, diverse 
outcomes and conflicts induced by different forms of power and discourse. Eco-
nomic expert discourses as transformative and dynamic devices became particularly 
relevant after the foundation of the EU through the Maastricht Treaty, because now 
a strong as well as flexible legal framework was established. This discursive-legal 
framework was used by different actors in the European universe as a tool for fur-
ther, faster and deeper transformation processes within European societies.  
A complex interpretative constellation emerged from the Maastricht legal 
framework which did not introduce stability to the economic constitution; rather, it 
provided the institutional background for permanent transformations, reforms and 
re-interpretations, as we will show in the next section. This paper grasps this new 
characteristic of the EU constitution with the notion of the ‘economic discursive 
square’. 
 
4. After the Maastricht Treaty: from ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ to the 
‘economic discursive pentagon’  
With the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the 
common market was finally realised. New member states joined the EU and the 
idea of a free trade area became more and more an institutional reality, based on a 
common economic foreign policy (customs union), equal access to all member 
states’ markets (common market), the free movement of goods, capital, people and 
services. In this section we want to show how and why the institutional constella-
tion of the EU economic governance apparatus, which emerged from the Maas-
tricht-EU treaties, opens up a socio-discursive space for translation. Thus, ‘neolib-
eralism’ is not manifested in the treaties. Rather, neoliberal politics results from a 
particular interpretation and discursive translation of treaties into national contexts 
mediated through a complex institutional system.     
Aside from problem-solving European studies, critical scholars have ana-
lysed this EU foundation as a pure market-based integration of the EU and the idea 




of the EU as a ‘neoliberal constitutional initiative’ (Gill 1998) and (later) ‘authoritar-
ianism’ emerged (Bruff 2014). From the perspective of the written words of the 
Treaty, the Maastricht process does indeed reduce the EU not only on economic 
issues, it also removed many reform-oriented and Keynesian elements from the 
agenda, offering to neoliberalism ‘juridical-legal tools’. In the Treaty, the EU is con-
stituted as a handbook style neoclassical free market area including fiscal discipline, 
and the ECB is devoted to targeting only inflation. Other economic and social goals 
such as targeting unemployment, promoting growth with fiscal measures, coordinat-
ing industrial policy and regional development based on a well-equipped European 
budget are mainly left to nation-states’ competencies (which are under the control 
of EU fiscal discipline). Only a few poorly equipped European Funds were made 
available to promote regional development, and member states were only gradually 
supported to improve industrial policy and social programmes (which were often 
restricted by EU competition law and fiscal discipline). Accordingly, the EU was 
designed according to a textbook style neoclassical free market economy, supervised 
by a fiscal policy state.   
However, the formation of the EU economic constitution was, neverthe-
less, characterised by two additional aspects that contradict the idea of a one-sided 
neoliberal project. On the one hand, EU institutions reflect an ongoing conflict be-
tween member states, influential groups and ideological views (Miró 2017). These 
conflicts led to many compromises within the Treaties, institutions as well as rules, 
acts and procedures of the EU governance apparatus. On the other hand, the initial 
Maastricht framework simply formed inappropriate and non-working institutions 
unable to act when economic, financial and social problems arise (Busch et al. 
2016). The EU governance apparatuses never formed a coherent system, they “were 
(and largely remain) more a space for negotiations between political representatives 
of member countries and other well-organized, powerful groups rather than unified 
expressions of popular political sentiments and policies” (Costantini 2017, p. 335).  
Thus, soon after the Maastricht Treaty, a couple more institutions were es-
tablished, and existing rules and procedures were changed. First, in 1997, the Stabil-
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ity and Growth Pact (SGP) was approved, and the ECB was established in 1998. 
The SGP changed the calculating procedures, and the Medium-Term Budgetary 
Objective (MTO) was established. Then, a long discussion started about how to cal-
culate a national budget in terms of expected GDP growth and calculated taxes. 
However, this entire system had already collapsed when many countries, especially 
Germany and France, could not submit a valid budgetary plan in the years between 
2000 and 2005. In this period, a couple of further compromises between member 
states and the EU commission were made, changing the re-submit procedure, the 
calculation of future GDP growth and the categorisation of expenses. In conse-
quence, the targets for budgetary expenses were diversified. “These included the 
need for public investments; the necessity for member states to pursue their efforts 
to implement structural reforms related to the aging of their populations as well as 
increasing employment and labour-force participation ratios; the prevailing cyclical 
conditions; the implementation of policies related to the Lisbon agenda; and the 
impact of R&D and innovation” (Costantini 2017, p. 338). In 2011 and 2012, the 
so-called Sixpack as well as the Fiscal Compact again changed the rules. Now, the 
commission has many more competencies to evaluate specific aspects of a country’s 
budget. According to Seikel and Truger (2019), these new rules provided the EU 
commission with more competencies to interpret certain aspects of a budget as ‘in-
vestment’ and ‘structural reform’ instead of ‘deficit’. Thus, to categorise member-
state expenses as ‘problematic’ in terms of fiscal stability or as part of ‘implement-
ing’ the commission’s recommendations to ‘improve stability’ and ‘promote com-
petitiveness’ is today largely a matter of economic argumentation and political deci-
sion-making.  
The scope for interpretation in terms of investment and structural reform 
already existed in the EU calculation system and the institutional framework of the 
SGP cannot simply be reduced to an ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ machine. In addi-
tion, the fiscal rules are not only applied by the EU commission; all interpretations 
and suggestions from the EU commission must be confirmed by member states 
through the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (EcoFin). Therefore, member 




states can reject or accept measures proposed by the EU commission. For this rea-
son, the EU economic constitution is characterised by a high degree of interpreta-
tive openness, offered by three mechanisms: first, the conflictual-compromising 
character of all Treaties, institutions and rules/procedures; second, by interpretative 
flexibility of the diverse aspects of a member state’s budget; third, by the multi-actor 
governance system of decision-making between member states and the EU com-
mission. Also, during the financial crisis, a couple of new institutions and compe-
tencies emerged (ESM, Banking Union) and other institutions such as the ECB, the 
IMF and the ‘Juncker Plan’ (EU Infrastructure and Investment Plan) also started to 
intervene in this discursive game. This interpretative openness of the EU economic 
constitution can best be illustrated by a system of exchanges, translations and inter-
pretations that we call the ‘economic discursive pentagon’. 
 
5. The discursive pentagon: the logic of economic constitutionalism  
In order to make the complex interpretative dynamics of today’s EU eco-
nomic constitution visible, we suggest analysing decision-making processes with an 
‘economic discursive pentagon’. The idea draws on our understanding of Foucault’s 
theory of dispositif applied to the case of the EU economic governance system as it 
is manifested in the European Semester. This model gives an idea of how various 
institutions, actors and texts come together in economically informed discourses 
where specialists, technicians, experts and politicians negotiate an apparatus for the 
perception, valuation and evaluation of, and intervention in, Europeanised social 
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Figure 1. The economic discursive pentagon. 
 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
 
 This pentagon consists of five elements and it makes translational pro-
cesses of economic policy concepts possible. This illustration also explains how the 
dispositif covers actors, institutions and texts as well as their translational interac-
tions. From such a discourse analytical point of view, austerity and other measures 
cannot simply be ‘implemented’, they are rather negotiated in complex translational 
processes. In the next section, we will analyse these translation processes from the 
perspective of two of angles of the discursive pentagon: A and E.  
Yet, generally speaking, a couple of interpretative dynamics can be identi-
fied from this model. First, the affected member state brings into this discursive 
process a specific situation (i.e., low GDP growth, high indebtedness etc.), a par-
ticular equipment of institutions, partners and competencies as well as other ele-
ments that affect the discursive power position of the affected state. Second, the 
EU institution(s) enter(s) the discursive process with their competencies, internal 
facilities, actors, analytical instruments and capabilities. On this level, a couple of le-
gal and professional aspects play an important role. Third, other member states are 




always part of decision-making processes, especially because the EU commission 
has only a few legal tools in order to control, intervene in and/or instruct a member 
state. Thus, legal (EcoFin) or para-legal (Euro Group) member-state councils play 
an important role in these discursive economic games. Fourth, a couple of lobbying 
groups (mostly from the business world) influence these complex processes, espe-
cially when it comes to setting up new regulations by the EU commission. Finally, 
the interpretative structure of the legal documents themselves is of great importance 
because the EU is not a legal ‘dictatorship’ where technical rules emerge immediate-
ly from legal texts. Texts as well as situations must always be interpreted, analysed 
and argued. Therefore, a certain ‘economic crisis situation’ does not interpret itself; 
and the rules of the treaty (e.g., fiscal rules) are always open to diverse and even 
contradictory readings. Against this backdrop, the EU commission, the ECB and 
the member states are free to apply various readings of a particular situation as well 
as of a certain EU document.  
Out of such complexity, different types of EU economic governance prac-
tices can emerge. One possibility is always discursive ‘chaos’ where no recognisable 
decision can be made. This is often the case, especially when member states expect 
more support for fiscal stimuli and other non-ordoliberal policies. Another option is 
‘consensus’. Here, all actors agree on a common reading of problems and legal 
texts. This is the case with many non-binding initiatives in the realms of education, 
science, culture and mobility where the EU assists member states through the sub-
sidiarity principle. These initiatives (such as the Bologna process or the Lisbon pro-
cess) complement core economic policies. Yet, ‘domination’ is a further possible 
outcome, especially when a group of actors can prevail against the will of another 
(group of) actors. This was the case between 2000 and 2005 when Germany and 
France violated the fiscal rules, and in the case of the austerity policy against the will 
of the Greek government during the Euro crisis. However, ‘autonomy’ is a fourth 
option when an actor cannot be influenced by others for various reasons. The reac-
tion of the Portuguese centre-left government after the 2015 elections may be one 
example of such a solution. Here, the government was able to leave the EU rescue 
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institutions in order to use its national financial leeway to find a way out of the fiscal 
crisis without support from EU institutions. In addition, ‘blaming’ might be another 
strategy that is usually applied by member states in order to shift the responsibility 
for unpopular measures to the EU. As we will see in the next section, Italian gov-
ernments have applied this strategy in order to legitimate neoliberal policies since 
the 1990s. Finally, the most common output is the so-called ‘compromise’ when ac-
tors arrive at a common solution out of contradictory readings. Compromise very 
often opens up space for further (re-)negotiations and they leave almost all actors 
behind in a situation that requires upcoming communication processes because no-
body leaves the political arena as a ‘winner’.  
‘Chaos’, ‘consensus’, ‘domination’, ‘autonomy’, ‘blaming’ and ‘compro-
mise’ are a few possible candidates for the outcomes of EU economic constitutional 
discourses brought about by the discursive square. However, many more can be im-
agined and found in empirical studies (Moravcsik 1997) and different modalities can 
also interact with each other. Yet, the main lesson we learn from such a perspective 
is that the EU economic governance system does not work as authoritarian one-way 
implementation. On the contrary, it is based on conflict, interpretation, reform and 
the endless foundation of new institutions. In the next section, we will illustrate the 
interpretative openness of the square by a short analysis of two aspects: in a first 
step, we will show how EU austerity directives fixed by the Sixpack and the Fiscal 
Compact have opened the way for flexible adoption by different member states that 
were in a similar situation. Here, we will quickly show how the cases of Greece, Italy 
and Portugal dealt very differently with the same economic doctrine. In this case, 
we consider how a ‘member state’ (top of the pentagon) translates the interaction 
between an ‘EU institution’ (right side of the pentagon), organized economic pres-
sure (bottom right of the pentagon), a ‘text’ (left side of the pentagon) and the 
‘council’ (bottom of the pentagon) into a political realty. In the final section, we will 
illustrate how the economic situation of a member state (Italy) is presented and 
changed by two discourses: the EU commission country report (European semes-
ter) published in February 2020 (before the outbreak of the corona pandemic) and 




the response of the Italian government published during the corona pandemic in 
June 2020. Both illustrative analyses show the highly interpretative and discursive 
character of the EU economic constitution.                
 
6. Translating Austerity: three selected case studies 
In this section, we will describe three different translation strategies of aus-
terity policies promoted by EU institutions and member-state councils during the 
financial crisis around 2009 into country-specific reform programmes. Our analysis 
is based on macroeconomic policy analyses (literature study) complemented by a 
study of the country reports of the European Semester between 2011 and 2015. We 
selected three countries: Greece, Portugal and Italy, for two reasons. First, all three 
countries are member of the so called PIIGS group, namely, those countries which 
were particularly hard-hit by the Euro crisis and candidates for (possible) EU rescue 
measures. Second, all three countries responded to austerity measures in very differ-
ent ways. For these two reasons, these countries are perfect candidates to illustrate 
the differences in translating austerity. We will start with the very drastic Greek case 
and show how and why Greece adopted austerity comprising four different modali-
ties, ranging from ‘consensus’ to ‘chaos’, ‘domination’ and ‘compromise’. We will 
then compare it with the Portuguese case by showing under which conditions ‘au-
tonomy’ can change the translation process. Finally, we analyse the Italian case 
where the introduction of austerity before, during and after the crisis was based on a 
‘blame’ game. 
 
6.1. The Greek case: from consensus to chaos and compromise 
Greece experienced rapid economic development in the post-dictatorship 
phase during the 1970s. After joining the European Economic Community in 1981, 
Greece experienced a second phase of economic growth, but experienced rapid 
transformation of its industrial structure as well. Since then, Greece has had a nega-
tive current account, with an underdeveloped industrial sector, a disproportionate 
service sector and agricultural production with a high, above average share of GDP. 
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Overall, the corporate structure is fragmented and familiar. Last but not least, for-
eign owners who benefited from privatisation dominate the Greek corporate land-
scape. The economic situation in Greece before the crisis was characterised by a re-
cession in 2008, high public debt and a high but shrinking unemployment rate, as 
well as a fragmented and client-oriented welfare state with very low taxation rates. 
When the crisis started in 2009, the Greek state was already overloaded with financ-
ing firms in crisis, similarly the welfare system and the public administration, be-
cause interest rates for Greek bonds were high and still rising from 2009 onwards. 
Accordingly, the first Memorandum of Understanding was set up in 2010 when the 
Social Democrats took power and made the real financial situation public.1 
The Greek government received a loan of €110 billion through an agree-
ment with the IMF, ECB and EU commission (Troika) in return for drastic cuts in 
wages, social programmes and pensions, and layoffs in public services. Further cuts 
in minimum wages, healthcare, and wages, as well as layoffs, privatisations, and the 
deregulation of labour markets, happened a year later, implemented by the ‘tech-
nical government’. A second Memorandum was signed in 2012, including further 
austerity measures. After each round of austerity, a new government was formed 
accompanied by an entire economic and social downturn (in terms of high unem-
ployment rates, GDP collapse, wages/income decrease, welfare cuts), a rise in pub-
lic debt and increasing difficulty in refinancing the public debt. In 2015, the left-
populist party SYRIZA won the election with an anti-austerity programme. This 
was the first government that explicitly did not agree with the idea that public debt 
can be reduced by austerity. Therefore, between 2009 and 2015, all governments 
acted on the basis of ‘compromise’ and ‘consensus’ with EU institutions (Chasoglou 
2015).  
With the take-over of government by the anti-austerity party SYRIZA, the 
Greek government entered into conflict with EU institutions. The Varoufakis/ 
 








Tsipras duo entered the scene by stopping all the austerity agreements of the former 
governments. At this moment, the Greek crisis was the starting point for a Europe-
an discourse on the general direction of the EU. The conflict was not only about 
concrete measures in Greece; rather, general issues were debated such as exiting the 
EU, solidarity between member states, the role of the EU as a fiscal community and 
the general direction of economic policy in the EU. For the first time, austerity was 
no longer presented as a ‘technical necessity’ but a political choice.  
After a year of a European-wide hot debate, another election and a refer-
endum in Greece, SYRIZA and the Troika agreed on a third Memorandum. This 
Memorandum still contained austerity measures but it also opened up some reform 
possibilities for Greece. While SYRIZA could achieve some minor reforms and 
stop drastic austerity cuts, a general stop to austerity and a turn-around of economic 
policy was not possible against the will of the Troika. As a result (and below the sur-
face of public attention), minimal economic growth, a small decrease in the unem-
ployment rate, a couple of social benefits, improvements in healthcare, a state re-
form and some other changes could be achieved. Finally, SYRIZA manged to leave 
the Memorandum process (at least gradually) and an economic programme was 
formulated before the conservative party won the election in 2019 (Karamessini 
2015). 
Thus, what we learn from the Greek case is that ‘consensus’ and ‘com-
promise’ were replaced by ‘chaos’ and a domination-oriented style of another ‘com-
promise’. Whereas the first phase can be described as a ‘consensus’ between the 
Greek government and EU institutions on drastic austerity, the second phase under 
SYRIZA introduced first ‘chaos’ and finally a ‘compromise under pressure’. In con-
trast to other crisis-prone member states such as Spain, Portugal and even Italy, 
Greece did not manage to reclaim its ‘autonomy’ from the EU austerity pro-
grammes. But the Greek revolt against the Troika (through ‘chaos’) has changed 
European economic policy discourses in at least two aspects (Maesse 2020b):  
- first, European fiscal solidarity through Euro bonds was discussed as a prac-
tical alternative to the existing fiscal system: this opened up new ways of 
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thinking that later paved the way for a debate on Corona bonds and finally 
made the EU recovery budget of €750 bn possible;  
- second, the diversity of economic policy measures going beyond a pure ne-
oliberal technocratic way of thinking and arguing became visible as a con-
troversy. This opened up the way for demanding more European measures 
and greater diversity of tools (represented by the Macron-Initiative and the 
Juncker-Plan). 
 
6.2. The Portuguese case: ending austerity by regaining autonomy 
Portugal is a young democracy, having abolished its military dictatorship in 
1974. In 1986, Portugal joined the European Economic Community. After a period 
of rapid economic growth, the country experienced a phase of economic stagnation, 
financial instability and increasing public debt from 1999 until the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 2007. Thus, the initial economic situation in Portugal before the 
Euro crisis was characterised by low GDP growth, increasing unemployment, in-
creasing public indebtedness and a growing current account deficit. For these rea-
sons, Portugal was dependent on foreign loans in order to refinance state apparat-
uses and economic activities. 
The initial reaction to the economic and financial crisis was a fiscal pro-
gramme in 2009. But the interest rates for state bonds rose and the public deficit 
grew as well, while public expenses increased step by step. The EU institutions did 
not support Portugal and in 2010 the Portuguese government decided to follow the 
EU strategy and fight the debt crisis with austerity programmes.     
Between 2010 and 2014, a couple of austerity measures were initiated.2 In a 
first step, the Portuguese government reduced public expenses. But it soon became 
obvious that this would not reduce the debt. In cooperation with the EU commis-
sion, ECB and European Council, further austerity measures were initiated in 2011. 
 








Austerity was basically implemented by cutting pensions, social programmes, 
healthcare, public investment and wages, as well as by deregulation of the labour 
market, reducing worker’s rights and layoffs. The situation escalated in 2011 
through strikes and social protests and Portugal was obliged to make an agreement 
(Memorandum of Understanding) with the so-called Troika (IMF, ECB, EU com-
mission) in order to receive rescue loans of about €78 billion cuts, deregulation and 
precarisation were implemented between 2011 and 2014, accompanied by strikes 
and social protests (Lühmann 2015).        
As a result of this austerity dynamic, the public debt increased, GDP 
growth was stopped, more and more jobs became precarious, wages were low and 
unemployment was high. In 2014, the austerity programme officially ended. The 
election in 2015 saw a change in government. Now, a centre-left coalition (Social 
Democrats, Greens-Communists and Socialists) formed the new government and 
stopped all austerity programmes. Through a reform-oriented political programme 
consisting of increases in the minimum wage, social programmes and public wages, 
the government managed to reduce unemployment and poverty as well as increase 
GDP growth. In contrast to Spain and Italy, the GDP per capita in 2018 (after just 
three years) was already at the pre-crisis level of 2008.  
To conclude, what we see here is a switch from a domination-oriented 
‘compromise’ between the EU institutions, the Council and the member state of 
Portugal to ‘autonomy’. Even if the EU was sceptical about the road that the cen-
tre-left Portuguese government followed, the government managed to apply ‘au-
tonomy’ through an ‘internal’ or ‘implied compromise’: it implemented some 
Keynesian reform measures in order to heal the worst wounds of austerity, but it 
never opted to revolt against the EU institutions (as Greece did). As a consequence, 
Portugal was able to move onto a reformist path, but without changing the dis-
courses in the EU. Thus, the Greek revolt was true theatre with a visible impact on 
Europe; and the Portuguese strategy remained unheard of by most people in the 
EU.       
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6.3. The Italian case: embedding EU-austerity within national conservative reform strategies    
In contrast to ‘late-comer member states’, Italy has been a constituent ac-
tor in the construction of the European institutional order since the beginning, 
mainly as a geopolitical strategy to remain anchored to Franco-German economic 
development. By the end of the ’80s, new financial expansionism and industrial re-
structuring eroded the ruling post-war party system. Party political capital was made 
by state-holding industries guiding economic development and generating high pub-
lic debt. In the early 1990s, a huge juridical campaign against party-industry coali-
tions delegitimized the traditional political class, empowering technocratic econo-
mists at the Italian central bank to guide the negotiation of Maastricht criteria (Dy-
son & Featherstone 1996). Since then, economic growth has been guided by centre-
left and technical governments whereby neoliberalization and permanent austerity 
were widespread in party system discourses long before the 2008 crisis (Cozzolino 
& Giannone 2019).     
The first consequence of the 2008 financial crisis was turmoil in the sec-
ondary markets, both EU institutions and financial interests pushed for the end of 
the Berlusconi coalition. Constitutional Europe worked through the Draghi-Trichet 
informal letter calling for the implementation of austerity provisions to calm sec-
ondary markets. A new technical government guided by an EU-inspired ordoliberal 
economist and former Commissioner, Mario Monti, seized power in 2011 to im-
plement austerity measures.3 In the public discourse, the government was called up-
on to restore the credibility of the country through emergency measures. Economic 
indicators, such as spread, became the yardstick for ruling the country. The immedi-
ate provisions of the government were the reform of pensions from a retributive to 
a contributive system and increasing the pension age, as well as strengthening the 
budgetary norms in the constitution as a basis for strong cuts in social services. 
Both measures were evidently too unpopular to be carried by a political parliamen-
tary coalition. While the pension reforms became part of the wider financial restruc-
 
3 For a detailed description of the policy process, see EU-Com: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/economic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-performance-country/italy_en 




turing of retirement management according to the European Union’s recommenda-
tions and transnational financial interest preferences, the integration of balance ad-
justments into the Italian constitution represented a strong field of affirmation for 
economic discourse in broader political debates.  
Thus, in contrast to almost all other larger EU countries, Italy applied aus-
terity policies from the 1990s onwards and used the crisis to increase and deepen 
austerity programmes to discipline the political class’s expenditure definition, even 
at the cost of sabotaging domestic industry. For this reason, the mostly conservative 
and right-wing populist governments in Italy never managed to bring the Italian 
economy onto a growth and innovation path: even if Italy is still a country with a 
high level of manufacturing and an average EU income, it is still suffering structural 
deficits at all levels of the economy: firms and investment, GDP growth and inno-
vation, budget and industrial policy. Austerity measures were applied by conserva-
tive and techno-leftist governments, with or without the EU. In this context, the 
EU mainly constitutes a discursive reference ‘to get blamed’ in order to legitimise 
austerity and delegate the political responsibility to an actor outside Italy, as well as a 
discursive ‘battering ram’ to introduce in national debates new reform-policy agen-
das and transnational preferences. Thus, ‘blaming’ and ‘battering’ are strategies for 
translating austerity, designed for governments, that, for different reasons, want to 
remain aligned with EU core countries.        
 
7. GDP as an argumentative trickster: how economic expert discourses offer 
and change interpretations  
In this last section we propose a brief discourse analysis of two EU-related 
reports on and by Italy, to show how economic argumentation strategy works with-
in the discursive pentagon. Indeed, in the following discourse analysis, we will only 
illustrate our general argument; therefore, we do not propose a policy-content anal-
ysis. We show that there is no single authoritarian neoliberal agenda looking at ref-
erences to GDP. On the contrary, we underline how the EU economic constitution 
is formed by translation processes. In this sense, the politics of constitutionalisation 
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of and within the EU is disseminated through the complex and heterogeneous 
structures and processes that we have labelled the ‘discursive pentagon’. That is, EU 
semester reports and member-state translation is the field where it is possible to 
study the discursive translation process empirically. 
An EU semester is a country report that offers an economic outlook for 
each member state, issuing a precise picture of what the economic situation is and, 
concurrently, what it should be, offering possible solutions and adjustments. In par-
ticular, the report enumerates critical problems of the country and the impact of 
legislative activity to solve them, including social welfare, health, economic outlook, 
productivity, wages, taxes, budget, competitiveness, ecological sustainability and so 
forth.  
The economic semester is a procedure fixed by EU Treaties and constantly 
changed by reforms, acts and amendments made by EU member states, the EU 
commission and the EU parliament. The country report is in a first step written by 
the EU commission on the basis of a macroeconomic analysis of each country’s 
specific goals and criteria (i.e., climate change, social justice, institutional outlook 
etc.), as well as commonly agreed objectives of previous reports (i.e., budgetary con-
solidation, investment etc.). Each report prepared by the commission must be rati-
fied by all EU member states’ Finance Minsters (EcoFin). The recommendations 
made by the European semester are all optional for respective member states. They 
have, nevertheless, a certain obligatory character because they document if a par-
ticular member state has cooperated in a constructive way with the EU/EcoFin in 
order to achieve the common economic goals of the European Union. Thus, they 
are part of an ongoing economic coordination process between the EU institutions 
and member states.            
The report on Italy dates from 2 February 2020 and underlines the vulner-
ability of the Italian economy due to high public debt, low GDP growth, high un-
employment, low wages, an unstable banking sector, an ageing population and so 
forth. In February (only a few weeks before the outbreak of the pandemic in Italy), 
the EU semester suggested that “high debt-servicing costs expose Italy’s public fi-




nances to a reduction in the fiscal space needed to implement growth and counter-
call measures” (EU Commission, 2020, p. 4). Therefore, the report suggests im-
proving economic performance in order to decrease the pressure on the public debt 
and offer space for growth programmes fighting unemployment and economic re-
cession. Starting from these data the report continues: 
 
“A sustained budgetary-neutral public investment stimulus would substantially 
improve output and result in small but positive cross-border spill-overs. A sim-
ulation with the Commission’s QUEST model suggests that an investment pro-
gramme would have a sizeable effect on real GDP, improve its external posi-
tion and lower its public debt ratio. However, the potential output effects are 
greatly dependent on the extent to which public investment is efficient”. (EU 
Commission 2020, p. 5) 
 
What we can see in this small excerpt is a typical reference to a standard economic 
argument about a trade-off between ‘budget’ and ‘investment stimulus’. According-
ly, high GDP growth would lead to declining unemployment, increasing wages and 
taxes and a decline in the public deficit. But the expected GDP growth for Italy in 
2019, 2020 and 2021 is low. Therefore, ‘investment programmes’ could stimulate 
GDP growth. This money would usually be taken from the public budget, but the 
public budgetary deficit is high and further credits would increase the deficit. There-
fore, the commission recommends ‘efficient investment’, because here the ‘output 
effects’ are high. This may imply two things: a huge investment programme is not 
advisable due to the high deficit; but no investment is harmful too because of the 
low GDP growth rate. What is interesting in this economic argumentation is that 
the ‘GDP growth rate’ works as the crux of argumentative matter here. It is the 
main starting point for interpreting all the other economic categories, such as ‘un-
employment’, ‘budget’, ‘innovation’, the ‘need for stimulus’ and so forth. Thus, 
‘GDP’ seems to play a special argumentative role in EU economic expert discourse.         
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A few months later, in the middle of the corona crisis, the Economic and 
Financial Document 2020 issued by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance 
responded to the initial report by the commission, redefining and questioning the 
economic statements of the EU semester. This has been taken further by an eco-
nomic statement from the Minister of the Economy and Finance, Gualtieri, pre-
sented in the Introduction of the report. Here, the initial negative diagnosis of the 
GDP is recognised: “[Given] the fall in production and consumption already rec-
orded and these difficult short-term prospects, the official GDP forecast for 2020, 
which dates back to last September’s Update to the Stability Programme, has been 
lowered from an increase of 0.6 per cent to a contraction of 8 per cent. This new 
forecast predicts a fall in GDP of more than 15 per cent in the first half of the year 
and a subsequent rebound in the second half of the year” (EUC 2020, p. III). Fol-
lowing the recognition of this ‘marked revision of the macroeconomic scenario’, the 
report reframes the commission’s suggestions as follows: 
 
“In the Update to the Stability Programme 2019, the policy objective of net 
borrowing for this year was set at 2.2 per cent of GDP. In the light of the sub-
sequent improvement in public accounts for 2019 and the good performance of 
revenues in January and February, it can be estimated that if the economy had 
not been affected by the covid-19 pandemic the net borrowing in 2020 would 
have been no more than 1.8 per cent of GDP. However, as described above, 
the macroeconomic scenario has changed dramatically over a short period: the 
lowering of the forecast for GDP growth compared to the Update to the Stabil-
ity Programme 2019, by 8.6 percentage points in terms of annual average 
growth, leads to a higher deficit of 4.1 percentage points of GDP”. (EUC 2020, 
p.12) 
 
With this response, the Italian member state implicitly argues that the EU commis-
sion’s suggestions are no longer valid (which was later supported by the Commis-
sion). This was not primarily initiated by the corona crisis as such, the number of 




infected people or the death rate. Rather, in a first (often implicit) argumentative 
step, the ‘health crisis’ must be translated into an economic indicator in order to be-
come relevant in the argumentative register of economic expert discourse. This is 
done by reference to expected GDP growth (‘lowering of the forecast for GDP 
growth’). This change to GDP as an economic indicator changes the entire argu-
mentative structure and offers a new space of interpretation. Following Levi-
Strauss’ theory of discursive change (Levi-Strauss 1966), we can call the ‘GDP’ indi-
cator a discursive trickster. Levi-Strauss used the notion of trickster to identify ele-
ments within the cultural symbolic universe of tribes which make social change pos-
sible. It is the starting point for the collapse of a universe of meanings. And indeed, 
through expected dramatic GDP losses, former EU policy agenda was immediately 
suspended. In addition, member states agreed on an entire set of help and rescue 
programmes at the EU level that were completely unthinkable before the corona 
crisis.           
In this sense, EU commission documents are powerful tableaux for eco-
nomic interpretation of the EU economic constitution. They offer the main lan-
guage for framing future legislative agendas. However, economic analyses of the EU 
are constructed by texts that are negotiated by member states and the commission, 
and implemented through interpretations by affected member states. There is no 
automatic (neoliberal or other) policy mechanism. All economic suggestions must 
be argued and discussed through and within discursive games occurring in institu-
tional devices and multiple decision-making procedures. This shows how the EU 
constitution is open to interpretation.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The contemporary European economic constitution is neither a single text 
from which every political decision can be derived automatically, nor is it an author-
itarian mechanism based on a legally fixed and coherent institutional order. Rather, 
it resembles a Foucauldian dispositif, consisting of a complex assemblage of texts, 
institutional constellations, transversal fields and rules open to various interpreta-
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tions. These interpretation processes are much more chaotic, contingent and open 
to socio-political struggle, working on the basis of ‘discursive translations’.  
In its epistemic-historical evolution, the EU was founded on economics and 
law as privileged languages. We have argued that, starting with the re-launch of Eu-
ropean economic integration in the late 1970s, economic discourses became a mani-
fest semantic battlefield for the construction of the EU constitution. To understand 
the (trans-)formational processes of the EU economic constitution as the outcome 
of complex discursive systems, we developed the idea of the ‘discursive pentagon’ 
as a model that allows examination of the dynamic interaction of different fields, in-
stitutions, rules and discourses. This model explains how sovereign actors, inter-
governmental institutions and specialized texts interact in translation processes. 
From this point of view, we have argued that economic measures cannot simply be 
vertically implemented; they are, rather, negotiated in complex socio-politically con-
text-based translational processes. 
Domination in Greece and autonomy in Portugal as well as blaming and 
battering in Italy, are only a few examples of how discursive translations operate. 
Indeed, these cases aimed to underline the openness and unexpected outcomes of 
globalised and Europeanised economic discourses. In the final section we illustrat-
ed, with an analysis of GDP as a discursive trickster, how the so-far dominant eco-
nomic interpretations have been re-negotiated in the face of the 2020–21 health 
emergency. As this section argues and illustrates, not only do institutional constella-
tions between the EU level and the national level open up spaces for interpretative 
flexibility, but economic texts too can themselves be read in different ways depend-
ing on the circumstances. The corona crisis has opened up new spaces for negotiat-
ing the post-pandemic order in and of the EU. After a year of long, complex nego-
tiations, it seems to us that our analysis can be confirmed: also, the expansionary 
measures issued to rescue European countries from the pandemic are the object of 
constant conflict, interpretation, re-interpretation and contestation, rather than a 
monolithic authoritarian mechanism. In this sense, looking at the EU economic 
constitution as an open discursive field can offer scholars, politicians, activists and 




ordinary people new ways to understand (and act in) the formation and transfor-
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